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The "Solely Criminal Purpose" Defense to the 
Enforcement of ms Summonses 
Darius J. Mehraban 
lliITRODUCTION 
Recent years have witnessed a gradual erosion of the practical 
distinctions between the civil and criminal investigations performed 
by federal administrative agencies.1 This trend arose naturally from 
a growing number of federal statutes and regulations that carry 
both civil and criminal penalties for their violation.2 Administrative 
agencies today wield investigative summons power3 almost as 
expansive as the grand jury subpoena power4 and can use that 
power to investigate without first deciding whether criminal or civil 
liability ultimately will be sought.s 
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) has participated to some 
extent in this intermingling of civil and criminal inquiry - with a 
corresponding increase in investigative efficiency - despite the fact 
that before 1982 the IRS issued summonses pursuant to a provision 
in the Internal Revenue Code, section 7602, that on its face gave 
the IRS only civil investigative authority.6 In the 1971 case 
Donaldson v. United States, 7 however, the Supreme Court inter­
preted section 7602 to allow the IRS to issue summonses for crimi­
nal investigation, at least as long as there existed some valid civil 
purpose.8 The Court's decision was not surprising: investigations 
into tax law violations frequently contain the potential for both civil 
1. See Graham Hughes, Administrative Subpoenas and the Grand Jury: Converging 
Streams of Criminal and Civil Compulsory Process, 41 V AND. L. REv. 573, 578-80 (1994). 
2. See Andrew Z. Glickman, Note, Civil Sanctions and the Double Jeopardy Clause: 
Applying the Multiple Punishment Doctrine to Parallel Proceedings After United States v. 
Halper, 76 VA. L. REv. 1251, 1278 n.145 (1990). 
3. For discussions of the administrative summons authority of federal agencies and the 
history of this authority, see 1 KENNETH CuLP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE§ 4.1 (3d ed. 1994); Hughes, supra note 1, at 595-601. 
4. See infra Part III. 
5. See Hughes, supra note 1, at 578-80, 587-89. 
6. See I.R.C. § 7602(a) (1994). Amendments subsequent to 1982 did not change the lan­
guage of subsection (a). 
7. 400 U.S. 517 (1971). 
8. See Donaldson, 400 U.S. at 535 ("Congress clearly has authorized the use of the sum­
mons in investigating what may prove to be criminal conduct."). 
The requirement of a concurrent civil purpose was arguably implicit in Donaldson; it was 
made explicit seven years later in United States v. LaSalle National Bank, 437 U.S. 298 (1978). 
See infra text accompanying notes 14-18. 
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and criminal liability.9 It would have greatly hampered tax law 
enforcement had the Court forced the IRS either to ignore poten­
tially criminal conduct or to give up its civil investigation altogether 
once it discovered such conduct.1° 
Donaldson, however, placed a singular limitation on the IRS's 
criminal investigative authority, what this Note calls the "Justice 
Department referral" doctrine: the IRS must cease issuing sum­
monses for a particular case once it refers that case to the 
Department of Justice for criminal prosecution.11 No other federal 
agency is subject to such a restriction,1 2 as the restriction found its 
roots in the Court's interpretation of the unique language of section 
7602.13 
In the 1978 case United States v. LaSalle National Bank,14 the 
Court reaffirmed the Justice Department referral doctrine and 
added an important corollary to it, what this Note calls the "solely 
criminal purpose" doctrine15: even before Justice Department 
9. See, e.g., LaSalle, 431 U.S. at 309 ("Congress has created a law enforcement system in 
which criminal and civil elements are inherently intertwined. When an investigation exam· 
ines the possibility of criminal misconduct, it also necessarily inquires about the appropriate· 
ness of assessing the . . .  civil tax penalty."). 
10. See Donaldson, 400 U.S. at 535-36 ("To draw a line where [the criminal investigation 
begins] would require the Service, in a situation of suspected but undetermined fraud, to 
forgo either the use of the summons or the potentiality of an ultimate recommendation for 
prosecution."). 
11. See 400 U.S. at 536 ("[A]n [IRS] summons may be issued in aid of an investigation if 
it is issued in good faith and prior to a recommendation for criminal prosecution."). 
Like other federal regulatory agencies that perform civil and criminal investigations, the 
IRS cannot prosecute criminal cases; only the Department of Justice may do so. Therefore, 
the IRS, like other agencies, must at some point refer its criminal cases to the Justice 
Department with a recommendation for prosecution. See generally 1 DA VIS & PIERCE, supra 
note 3, § 4.3. 
12. Other federal agencies' postreferral investigative powers have been upheld when 
challenged. See United States v. Merit Petroleum, Inc., 731 F.2d 901, 905 (Temp. Erner. Ct. 
App. 1984) (upholding Department of Energy subpoenas); United States v. Educational Dev. 
Network Corp., 884 F.2d 737, 742 (3d Cir. 1989) (upholding Defense Department subpoe· 
nas); United States v. Aero Mayflower Transit Co., 831 F.2d 1142, 1145-46 (D.C. Cir. 1987) 
(upholding Defense Department Inspector General subpoenas); United States v. Gel Spice 
Co., 773 F.2d 427, 432-33 (2d Cir. 1985) (upholding FDA inspections); In re EEOC, 709 F.2d 
392, 397 (5th Cir. 1983) (upholding EEOC discovery); SEC v. Dresser Indus., 628 F.2d 1368, 
1377-80 (D.C. Cir. 1980)(en bane). 
13. LaSalle put it this way: 
In § 7602 Congress has bestowed upon the Service the authority to summon production 
for four purposes only: for "ascertaining the correctness of any return, making a return 
where none has been made, determining the liability of any person for any internal reve­
nue tax . . .  or collecting any such liability." Congress therefore intended the summons 
authority to be used to aid the determination and collection of taxes. These purposes do 
not include the goal of filing criminal charges against citizens. 
United States v. LaSalle Natl. Bank, 437 U.S. 298, 317 n.18 (1978). 
14. 437 U.S. 298 (1978). 
15. As a practical matter, this doctrine and the Justice Department referral doctrine gave 
taxpayers defenses against the enforcement of IRS summonses. The terminology of this 
Note attempts to be sensitive to the difference between a Court-made "doctrine" that prohib­
its certain IRS investigative conduct and the "defense" that the doctrine gives taxpayers who 
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referral, the IRS may not issues summonses solely for a criminal 
investigative purpose.16 In other words, the IRS loses the power to 
investigate criminal elements of a particular case once it has com­
pleted its civil investigation of that case. The Court stated that it 
would "not countenance delay in submitting a recommendation to 
the Justice Department [for criminal prosecution] when there is an 
institutional commitment to make the referral and the Service 
merely would like to gather additional evidence for the prosecu­
tion. "17 The Court characterized such a delay as the equivalent of 
issuing summonses after a Justice Department referral and there­
fore deemed the practice an impermissible expansion of the govern­
ment's criminal discovery rights.1s 
Congress codified the Justice Department referral doctrine 
when it amended section 7602 as part of the Tax Equity and Fiscal 
Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA).19 Congress did not codify 
the solely criminal purpose doctrine, however, and courts have split 
as to whether this doctrine survived the TEFRA Amendments. 
Specifically, the Fourth and Seventh Circuits have stated that the 
solely criminal purpose doctrine survived the amendments,20 while 
the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits have held that the amendments to 
section 7602 eliminated the doctrine.21 
The solely criminal purpose question is a criminal procedure 
issue with significant potential consequences for the rights of those 
under criminal tax investigation. If the LaSalle Court was correctly 
concerned that allowing the issuance of IRS summonses for a solely 
criminal investigation would permit the government to "expand its 
criminal discovery rights,"22 courts should be reluctant to find that 
Congress implicitly eliminated the solely criminal purpose defense. 
The IRS should not be able to use its broad civil investigative pow­
ers to subvert protections afforded potential criminal tax 
defendants. 
This Note argues, however, that this important concern for pro­
cedural rights is misplaced in this case, and sides with those courts 
that have held that the TEFRA Amendments did eliminate the 
challenge the enforcement of I RS summonses. Both terms are used, but in situations in 
which either term would be appropriate, this Note uses "defense " in order to focus on the 
rule as it affects the taxpayer. 
16. See LaSalle, 437 U.S. at 313-17. 
17. LaSalle, 437 U.S. at 316-17. 
18. See LaSalle, 437 U.S. at 317. 
19. Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 333(a), 96 Stat 324, 622 (codified at I. R. C. § 7602 (1994)). 
20. See Hintze v. I RS, 879 F.2d 121, 127 n.8 (4th Cir. 1989); United States v. Michaud, 907 
F.2d 750, 752 & n.2 (7th Cir. 1990)(en bane). 
21. See United States v. Abrahams, 905 F.2d 1276, 1281 n.4 (9th Cir. 1990); La Mura v. 
United States, 765 F.2d 974, 980 n.9 (11th Cir. 1985). 
22. LaSalle, 437 U.S. at 317. 
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solely criminal purpose defense. Part I uses the text and legislative 
history of the amended section 7602 to show that Congress specifi­
cally intended to eliminate the solely criminal purpose defense. 
Part II contends that the Fourth and Seventh Circuits wrongly 
relied on language in the Supreme Court case United States v. Stu­
art, 23 which does not, as these courts believed, signal the continuing 
viability of the solely criminal purpose defense. Finally, Part III 
demonstrates that eliminating the solely criminal purpose defense 
does not endanger the rights of potential criminal defendants at all. 
This Note concludes that the Fourth and Seventh Circuits are incor­
rect both as a matter of statutory interpretation and as a matter of 
policy, and that courts should not hesitate to implement Congress's 
clear intent to eliminate the solely criminal purpose defense. 
I. CONGRESSIONAL INTENT 
This Part argues that Congress intentionally amended section 
7602 to eliminate the solely criminal purpose defense. Section I.A 
contends that this intent is clear from the statutory language, while 
section I.B shows how this intent is visible in the legislative history 
of the amended provision. 
A. The Statute 
Congress eliminated the solely criminal purpose defense by 
adding subsections (b) and (c) to section 7602. These amendments 
gave the IRS an explicit grant of authority for criminal investigation 
and a clearly defined limitation on its use - a limitation that did 
not include the solely criminal purpose doctrine. 
Prior to the TEFRA amendments to section 7602, the IRS pos­
sessed no explicit statutory basis for its exercise of criminal investi­
gative authority. The pre-1982 section 7602- subsection (a) of the 
current statute - gave the IRS the power to examine any docu­
ments that "may be relevant or material" to its investigation and to 
take testimony from the person under investigation or other per­
sons who may have "relevant or material" things to say.24 The IRS 
could do these things 
[f]or the purpose of ascertaining the correctness of any return, making 
a return where none has been made, determining the liability of any 
person for any internal revenue tax or the liability at law or in equity 
of any transferee or fiduciary of any person in respect of any internal 
revenue tax, or collecting any such liability .... 25 
23. 489 U.S. 353 (1989). 
24. I. R. C. § 7602 (1976){amended version at I. R. C. § 7602{a) (1994)). 
25. I.R. C. § 7602 (1976){amended version at I. R. C. § 7602{a) (1994)). 
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Yet these were all civil investigative purposes. It was only through 
the Donaldson and LaSalle decisions that the IRS's criminal inves­
tigative authority was explicitly recognized.26 
The 1982 amendments to section 7602 gave the IRS express stat­
utory authority to issue summonses for criminal investigations by 
adding subsection (b ), entitled "Purpose may include inquiry into 
offense."27 This subsection states, "[t]he purposes for which the 
Secretary may [issue summonses] include the purpose of inquiring 
into any offense connected with the administration or enforcement 
of the internal revenue laws."28 The word "offense" means criminal 
violation.29 Section 7602(b) thus gives the IRS an independent stat­
utory basis for its criminal investigative authority. 
In giving the IRS the authority to perform criminal investiga­
tions, subsection (b) implicitly overrules the holding of LaSalle. 
The LaSalle Court had held that an IRS criminal investigation was 
permitted only so long as a valid civil investigative purpose was also 
present, because the statute contained no "affirmative grant of 
authority for purely criminal investigations."30 Thus Congress, in 
providing such an "affirmative grant," effectively changed the fun­
damental assumptions under which the Court had ruled. 
Furthermore, in carving out but a single exception to the IRS's 
criminal investigative authority in subsection (c), Congress left no 
room for the solely criminal purpose doctrine. Subsection ( c) codi­
fies the Justice Department referral doctrine, providing that "[n]o 
SUI11Il).ons may be issued . . .  with respect to any person if a Justice 
Department referral is in effect with respect to such person."31 A 
Justice Department referral is "in effect" in a given case if one of 
two specific conditions is met: either the IRS has referred the case 
to the Justice Department for criminal investigation or prosecution, 
or the Justice Department has requested IRS information on the 
case for the same purpose. 32 Subsection ( c) therefore prohibits the 
26. See supra notes 6-18 and accompanying text. 
27. I. R. C. § 7602(b) (1994). 
28. I.R. C. § 7602(b) (1994). 
29. According to Black's Law Dictionary, "[t]he word 'offense' . . .  generally implies a 
felony or a misdemeanor infringing public as distinguished from mere private rights, and 
punishable under the criminal laws." BLACK'S LAw D1cnoNARY 1081 (6th ed. 1990). 
Congress's use of the term "offense" elsewhere in § 7602 also indicates that Congress meant 
the term to refer to a criminal violation: A Justice Department referral is "in effect" under § 
7602( c) if the I RS "has recommended to the Attorney General a grand jury investigation of, 
or the criminal prosecution of, [a] person for any offense" under the tax laws. I.R. C. 
§ 7602(c)(2)(A)(1994)(emphasis added). Because the grand jury can be used only for crimi­
nal investigation, see WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. IsRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
§ 8.8(d) (2d ed. 1992) (discussing United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 683 
(1958), Congress must have intended "offense" to mean a criminal violation. 
30. United States v. LaSalle Natl. Bank, 437 U.S. 298, 316 n.18 (1978). 
31. I.R. C. § 7602(c) (1994). 
32. A Justice Department referral is considered in effect with respect to a person if: 
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issuing of summonses only if a tax case is already in the hands of the 
Justice Department, while the solely criminal purpose doctrine 
operates only prior to Justice Department referral.33 Therefore, the 
solely criminal purpose doctrine does not fall under subsection (c)'s 
exception to the IRS's criminal investigative authority. The lan­
guage of the amended statute thus leaves no room for the contin­
ued existence of the solely criminal purpose doctrine. 
B. The Legislative History 
The legislative history of the TEFRA amendments reveals that 
Congress intended to eliminate the solely criminal purpose defense. 
The Report of the Senate Fmance Committee, which added the rel­
evant amendments to the summons provision,34 explains that the 
defense "spawned protracted litigation without any meaningful 
results for the taxpayer."35 The Report then states that in order to 
have a more workable definition of when the IRS's criminal sum­
mons power exists, "it was necessary to expand the purposes for 
which an [IRS] summons may be issued."36 This expansion was 
necessary because "[t]he restrictions ... stated in LaSalle arise from 
the provision of [pre-TEFRA] law which limits the use of adminis­
trative summonses to the determination and collection of taxes. "37 
(i) the Secretary has recommended to the Attorney General a grand jury investigation 
of, or the criminal prosecution of, such person for any offense connected with the admin­
istration or enforcement of the internal revenue laws, or 
(ii) any request is made under section 6103(h)(3)(B) [permitting disclosure of I RS infor­
mation to the Justice Department upon request for use in criminal investigation or pros­
ecution] for the disclosure of any return or return information ... relating to such 
person. 
I.R. C. § 7602(c)(2)(A) (1994). 
33. See, e.g., LaSalle, 437 U.S. at 316-17 ("We shall not countenance delay in submitting a 
recommendation to the Justice Department . . . . ") (emphasis added). 
34. See H. R. CoNF. REP. No. 97-760, at 584 (1982) ("The conference agreement follows 
the Senate amendment. "). 
35. S. REP. No. 97-494, vol. 1, pt. 2, at 285 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 781, 
1031. The Committee was criticizing the solely criminal purpose defense for unnecessarily 
complicating the summons enforcement process. When challenged, IRS summonses must be 
enforced by a court, see I.R. C. § 7604 (1994), which will hear defenses offered by the tax· 
payer under investigation. Courts ruling on the availability of the solely criminal purpose 
defense allowed complex discovery and conducted extensive hearings on the question of 
whether the I RS had made an institutional commitment to refer a case to the Department of 
Justice. See generally Laura S. Wertheimer, Note, The Institutional Bad Faith Defense to the 
Enforcement of IRS Summonses, 80 CoLUM. L. REv. 621 (1980). The Committee believed 
this litigation was wasteful. See also id. at 644 ("[T]he lower courts [litigating the solely crim· 
inal purpose defense] have expended judicial resources and delayed the enforcement of the 
revenue laws reviewing allegations that rarely reveal institutional abuse. "). 
36. S. REP. No. 97-494, at 285 (emphasis added). 
37. Id. The Committee was correct in its characterization of LaSalle. The decision makes 
this reasoning explicit in a footnote: 
Congress . . .  intended the summons authority to be used to aid the determination and 
collection of taxes. These purposes do not include the goal of filing criminal charges 
against citizens. Consequently, summons authority does not exist to aid criminal investi· 
gations solely. The error of the dissent is that it seeks a limit on the face of the statute 
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Consequently, the Finance Committee decided to insert an 
independent grant of authority for criminal investigation, thereby 
eliminating the solely criminal purpose defense: No other under­
standing of the amendments would account for the Committee's 
stated intention to "expand the purposes for which an [IRS] sum­
mons may be issued."38 The only limitations on the Service's crimi­
nal summons authority prior to TEFRA were the two contained in 
Donaldson and LaSalle, 39 and Congress codified one of these limi­
tations, the Justice Department referral defense.40 If the solely 
criminal purpose defense were to exist now, there would have been 
no change whatsoever in IRS summons authority. Therefore, if the 
legislative history is to have any meaning, it must mean that 
Congress eliminated the solely criminal purpose defense. 
II. THE IMPACT OF llNITED STATES v. STUART 
The Fourth and Seventh Circuits concluded from language in 
the 1989 Supreme Court case United States v. Stuart41 that the solely 
criminal purpose defense still survives.42 This Part asserts that 
Stuart does not signal the continuing viability of the solely criminal 
purpose defense, and that the Fourth and Seventh Circuits' reliance 
on Stuart was based on a misreading of the language of that case. 
In Stuart, the Court addressed whether the IRS could issue 
administrative summonses to assist the Canadian Department of 
National Revenue (Revenue Canada) in a criminal investigation of 
Canadian citizens.43 Pursuant to articles XIX and XXI of the 1942 
Convention Respecting Double Taxation between the United 
States and Canada,44 Revenue Canada asked the IRS to provide 
them with records of these taxpayers' accounts at a Washington 
bank.45 To this end, the IRS issued summonses for the bank 
when it should seek an affirmative grant of summons authority for purely criminal 
investigations. 
LaSalle, 437 U.S. at 316 n.18. 
38. S. REP. No. 97-494, at 285. 
39. See supra notes 11-18 and accompanying text.. 
40. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text. 
41. 489 U.S. 353 (1989). For a more comprehensive discussion of Stuart, see Hugh P. 
Quinn, Note, Administrative Summonses Can Be Utilized in International Criminal Investiga­
tions: United States v. Stuart, 43 TAX LAW. 501 (1990). 
42. See United States v. Michaud, 907 F.2d 750, 752 n.2 (7th Cir. 1990) (en bane); Hintze 
v. IRS, 879 F.2d 121, 127 n.8 (4th Cir. 1989). 
43. See Stuart, 489 U.S. at 356. 
44. These Articles give the IRS the power, upon request and when consistent with United 
States law, to convey taxpayer information within its jurisdiction to Canadian authorities in 
order to aid them in the determination of Canadian tax liability. See Convention Respecting 
Double Taxation, Mar. 4, 1942, U.S.-Can., arts. 19, 21, 56 Stat. 1399, 1405-06; see also Stuan, 
489 U.S. at 355-56. 
45. See Stuart, 489 U.S. at 356. 
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records, and the Canadian taxpayers challenged these summonses 
in U.S. district court.46 The issue before the Supreme Court was 
whether the IRS must determine that a Canadian tax investigation 
has not reached a stage analogous to Justice Department referral 
before the IRS can issue administrative summonses to aid the 
Canadian investigation.47 The Court held that neither domestic 
revenue law nor the 1942 convention required this condition on 
enforcement. 48 
Dealing with domestic revenue law first, the Court concluded 
that section 7602(c) did not apply in this case because "it speaks 
only to investigations into possible violations of United States reve­
nue laws."49 Specifically, section 7602(c) only prohibits the issu­
ance of a summons if a Justice Department referral is in effect.so A 
Justice Department referral was clearly not in effect with respect to 
the Canadian taxpayers - they were under investigation only by 
Canadian authorities.51 The Court read literally the phrase "the 
Justice Department" in section 7602(c), refusing to analogize to 
equivalent law enforcement agencies. 
In the process of using the legislative history of section 7602(c) 
to support its position, the Court spoke of LaSalle in a way that 
seemed to indicate that it considered LaSalle's solely criminal pur­
pose doctrine to be good law. After mentioning the two parts of 
LaSalle's holding - the Justice Department referral doctrine and 
the solely criminal purpose doctrine - the Court stated: "When 
Congress codified the essence of our [LaSalle] holding in§ 7602(c), 
it apparently shared our concern about permitting the IRS to 
encroach upon the rights of potential criminal defendants. "52 
· The Fourth and Seventh Circuits incorrectly believed that the 
Court referred to the solely criminal purpose doctrine as the 
"essence " of the LaSalle holding. The Court, however, was in fact 
describing the Justice Department referral doctrine, which, 
although first stated in Donaldson, 53 was explicitly reaffirmed in 
LaSalle. 54 A close examination of the Court's language reveals the 
Fourth and Seventh Circuits' mistake: The Court referred to 
"[w]hen Congress codified the essence of our holding in § 7602(c) 
46. See Stuart, 489 U.S. at 356-57. 
47. See Stuart, 489 U.S. at 355-56. 
48. See Stuart, 489 U.S. at 356. 
49. Stuart, 489 U.S. at 362 (emphasis added}. 
50. See Stuart, 489 U.S. at 362. 
51. See Stuart, 489 U.S. at 362. 
52. Stuart, 489 U.S. at 363. 
53. See Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 536 (1971). 
54. See United States v. LaSalle Natl. Bank, 437 U.S. 298, 311-13 (1978). 
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• • • •  "55 The only court-made rule Congress codified in section 
7602(c), however, was the rule that no IRS summons could issue 
after a Justice Department referral.56 The solely criminal purpose 
doctrine is, in fact, conspicuously absent from this subsection. 
While the Court's choice of words was misleading, the Court's own 
language reveals that it was describing the Justice Department 
referral doctrine, and not the solely criminal purpose doctrine.57 
Therefore the Stuart case, which was the heart of the Fourth and 
Seventh Circuits' justification for holding that the solely criminal 
purpose doctrine survives,58 says nothing to contradict what Part I 
of this Note contends - that the TEFRA amendments eliminated 
the solely criminal purpose defense. 
III. THE SOLELY CRIMINAL PURPOSE DEFENSE AND 
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 
This Part demonstrates that the elimination of the solely crimi­
nal purpose defense and the consequent expansion of IRS criminal 
investigative power do not diminish protection of those under crim­
inal tax investigation. In fact, IRS investigations through section 
7602 summonses offer greater procedural protection to the 
potential criminal defendant than do Justice Department investiga­
tions using the grand jury subpoena power.59 Thus the IRS has lit­
tle incentive to delay referral of a criminal case to the Justice 
Department. Additionally, insofar as the IRS does delay referral, 
such delay will not "permit the Government to expand its criminal 
discovery rights," as the LaSalle Court had feared.60 
55. Stuart, 489 U.S. at 363. 
56. See supra section I.A. 
57. See supra text accompanying note 55. 
Judge Richard Posner also reaches this conclusion in his dissent in Michaud: 
[M]y brethren infer [from Stuart] that the IRS is not permitted to use the summons 
procedure after the Service "has abandoned any proper civil purpose," even if there has 
been no referral to the Justice Department This misunderstands Stuart; it also misun­
derstands section 7602{c) and its interplay with 7602{b). All the passage quoted from 
Stuart means is that subsection (c) defines the forbidden encroachment as occurring 
when the case is referred to the Justice Department. • . .  Before that happens, however, 
the Service's powers are defined by subsection {b), which expressly authorizes the use of 
the summons procedure to investigate criminal offenses and says nothing about requir­
ing a civil purpose. Nothing in Stuart is to the contrary. 
United States v. Michaud, 907 F.2d 750, 756-57 {7th Cir. 1990){en banc){Posner, J., 
dissenting). 
58. See Michaud, 907 F.2d at 752 n.2 (7th Cir. 1990) (quoting Stuart, 489 U.S. at 363, and 
Hintze v. IRS, 879 F.2d 121, 127 {4th Cir. 1989)); Hintze, 819 F.2d at 128 n.8 (quoting Stuart, 
489 U.S. at 363). 
59. See infra notes 61-73 and accompanying text. 
60. United States v. LaSalle Natl. Bank, 437 U.S. 298, 317 {1978). 
For a more comprehensive discussion of the policy of the LaSalle rules, concluding not 
only that there is no compelling justification for the "solely criminal purpose" rule, but also 
that the restriction on the issuance of summonses after referral to the Justice Department is 
unnecessary, see Hughes, supra note 1, at 603-09. 
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A comparison of grand jury subpoena authority and IRS sum­
mons authority reveals that IRS summonses offer greater protec­
tion to targets of investigation than do grand jury subpoenas. The 
grand jury subpoena power wielded by the Justice Department is 
extensive and largely unrestricted; several features of grand jury 
subpoenas make them an extremely flexible investigative tool. 
First, the grand jury itself has almost no control over the investiga­
tive subpoena process.61 Justice Department attorneys may obtain 
subpoenas from a court clerk without even consulting a grand 
jury,62 and they need not make a showing of probable cause.63 
Instead, grand jury subpoenas are subject to only the loosest 
requirement of relevancy.64 Furthermore, the denial of a motion to 
quash a grand jury subpoena is not an appealable final order.6s 
Finally, witnesses testifying before the grand jury do not even have 
the right to the presence of counsel in the grand jury room.66 In 
fact, there are only two significant restrictions on grand jury sub­
poena power: First, the subpoenas can be issued only for criminal 
investigation, and second, a presumption of secrecy applies to 
everything that comes before a grand jury.67 
The IRS summons power, while similar, is more restricted. Like 
grand jury subpoenas, IRS summonses, when challenged, must be 
enforced by a court68 but need not be supported by probable 
cause.69 The "good faith" test for enforcement of IRS summonses, 
although a liberal one,70 is no more liberal than enforceability 
61. See JEROID H. IsRAEL ET AL, Wl:IlTE CoLLAR CRIME: LAw AND PRAcnCE 293.94 
(1996). 
62. See id. at 294. 
63. The Supreme Court has held that grand jury subpoenas are not searches or seizures 
falling under the protection of the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. Dionisio, 410 
U.S. 1, 15 (1973). 
64. See LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 29, § 8.7(a), (c) (describing liberal reasonableness 
requirements for subpoenas); Hughes, supra note 1, at 606 (stating that grand jury subpoena 
authority "extends to anything of conceivable relevance to the investigation and prosecution 
of a criminal case"). 
65. See Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323 (1940). 
66. This issue has never been squarely ruled upon by the Supreme Court, but there is 
strong dicta to this effect in United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 581 '(1976)(plurality 
opinion), and the lower courts have followed it. See LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 29, 
§ 8.15. 
67. See Hughes, supra note 1, at 577 (outlining these two restrictions). The Justice 
Department may have reasons for desiring the latter restriction. See LAFAVE & ISRAEL, 
supra note 29, § 8.3(f) (explaining why "secrecy requirements are commonly cited as [an] 
investigative advantage of the grand jury"). 
68. See I.R.C. § 7604(b) (1994). 
69. See United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 52-57 (1964). 
70. The IRS need only show that "the investigation will be conducted pursuant to a legiti­
mate purpose, that the inquiry may be relevant to the purpose, that the information sought is 
not already within the [Service's] possession, and that the administrative steps required by 
the Code have been followed." Powel� 379 U.S. at 57-58. 
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requirements for grand jury subpoenas. As one commentator put 
it: 
The IRS cannot procure anything by way of a summons that a grand 
jury cannot obtain by use of its subpoena power. Civil summons 
power simply is not any broader than a grand jury's criminal discov­
ery through compulsory process, which extends to anything of con­
ceivable relevance to the investigation and prosecution of a criminal 
case.71 
Furthermore, IRS summonses carry two restrictions that make 
them more protective of those under investigation thari grand jury 
subpoenas. A taxpayer can appeal the denial of a motion to quash 
an IRS summons,72 and persons testifying under administrative 
summonses may have counsel present when testifying.73 
Because the use of IRS summonses gives the government no 
additional investigative power, the IRS gains no advantage by 
unreasonably delaying referral of a criminal case to the Justice 
Department. Assuming that the goal of IRS criminal investigation 
is the successful prosecution of criminal violators of the tax laws, 
the IRS will have good reason to refer its criminal cases to the 
Justice Department as soon as it has gathered enough evidence to 
conclude that prosecution is necessary. Furthermore, if the IRS 
does, for some reason, delay referral to th� Justice Department of a 
criminal case, this delay will not expand the government's criminal 
discovery rights for the reasons stated above. Therefore, LaSalle's 
concern for the rights of potential criminal tax defendants is 
misplaced. 
CONCLUSION 
The solely criminal purpose defense to the enforcement of IRS 
summonses did not survive the TEFRA amendments to the tax 
summons provision. A close reading of the statute and legislative 
history makes this clear, and the discussion of the provision in 
United States v. Stuart says nothing to indicate otherwise. This 
would be a simple issue of statutory interpretation if eliminating 
this restriction on the IRS were not perceived as adversely affecting 
individual rights. Eliminating the solely criminal purpose defense, 
however, does not lessen the rights of criminal defendants at all. In 
fact, taxpayers might rather remain under IRS investigation for as 
long as possible during a criminal investigation because of the 
71. Hughes, supra note 1, at 606; see also Wertheimer, supra note 35, at 642 ("Before 
referral, the substantive power of the agency summons is analogous to that of the grand jury's 
subpoena, and the procedural protections afforded the taxpayer under the former are 
greater.") (footnotes omitted). 
72. Orders enforcing administrative summonses have been appealable final orders since 
ICC v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447 (1894). 
73. See 5 U.S.C. § 555(b) (1994). 
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somewhat greater protections offered by IRS summonses. The 
elimination of the defense brings the IRS one step closer to the 
flexibility afforded other agencies in their investigation of violators 
of federal statutes, without a corresponding loss in protections for 
the individual. There is, therefore, no reason for courts to refrain 
from following the clear intent of Congress to eliminate the solely 
criminal purpose defense. 
